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In recent weeks, lawmakers, diplomats, and analysts have renewed a bitter debate over whether the United States should send military help to Ukraine. With tensions between Ukraine and Russia rising, the subject of American assistance for Kyiv has returned to the center of international debate, raising concerns about the ramifications for regional security and US foreign policy goals.
The debate over US military aid to Ukraine is multidimensional, with both supporters and opponents giving a variety of justifications to support their respective perspectives. Those who support providing military aid say that it is critical to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian aggression and discourage future intrusions into Ukrainian territory. They argue that such help is compatible with America’s commitment to aiding its friends while respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity.
On the other side of the argument, opponents of military aid to Ukraine express concerns about the risks and implications of rising tensions with Russia. They warn that giving deadly weapons to Kyiv will aggravate Moscow and intensify the crisis in eastern Ukraine, resulting in further instability and violence in the region. Some doubt the efficiency of military support in creating long-term peace and stability, arguing that diplomatic methods may be more helpful in settling the conflict.
The argument over US military aid to Ukraine is complicated by political concerns and larger geopolitical trends. As the Biden administration seeks to rebalance America’s approach to Russia and prioritize strategic interests such as arms control and nuclear non-proliferation, the issue of military assistance to Kyiv has become inextricably linked to broader efforts to manage relations with Moscow and promote regional stability.
Amid these opposing arguments and interests, the Biden administration is under pressure to strike a balance between support for Ukraine and wider strategic goals and diplomatic concerns. While President Biden has reaffirmed America’s commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the administration and policymakers in Washington continue to debate and deliberate on how best to support Kyiv in the face of Russian aggression.
As the debate over US military aid to Ukraine continues, observers and stakeholders will be looking intently to see how the Biden administration navigates these difficult problems and balances opposing interests in order to pursue a cohesive and effective foreign policy agenda.
What happens if Ukraine does not receive further military aid?
If Ukraine does not get further US military help, it may struggle to continue its battle before long. Battlefield evaluations are gloomy. Officials in Washington believe that Western weaponry and finances, particularly those from the United States, helped Kyiv avoid the worst while also contributing to surprise successes earlier in the battle. These successes raised optimism that Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive would drive Russian soldiers back and urge the Kremlin to prepare for negotiations that may lead to long-term peace. Instead, Kyiv’s soldiers encountered a tough Russian resistance and made little advance.
Despite huge manpower casualties over the previous two years, Moscow now has the advantage and is putting pressure on Ukrainian defenders. Supply constraints caused by Washington’s refusal to enact a supplemental spending bill, as well as the slow ramp-up of defense manufacturing on both sides of the Atlantic, are exacerbating the scarcity and forcing Ukraine to limit ammunition. Ukraine’s defense minister warned in January that a lack of artillery ammunition was a reason for alarm. Russia outgunned Ukraine’s artillery five to one in the war for the vital eastern town of Avdeeva, from which Ukrainian soldiers were forced to retreat in mid-February after months of heavy combat. If Kyiv is to continue operating, its supporters must transport additional ammunition and equipment, particularly more important 155mm rounds and air defense systems. Ukrainian militaries are already obliged to choose which towns or other places to protect with their interceptors. Without interceptors, the country will be vulnerable to aerial attacks, a situation that is virtually certainly unsustainable.
Is there a way to break the congressional logjam?
In theory, yes, but none appear to be totally trustworthy. When the House and Senate return from recess at the end of February, the first order of business will be to pass a fiscal year 2024 budget bill to avert a government shutdown. Speaker Johnson has stated unequivocally that when he returns, this problem will be his top priority. If there is a shutdown, the space and time for debate about Ukraine will be curtailed much further.
While there are ways for parliamentarians to move the Ukraine package even without the speaker’s approval, the difficulties are enormous. The first, proposed by House Democratic leadership, is a discharge petition, which would allow Democrats, with the support of sympathetic Republicans, to bypass Speaker Johnson and compel a vote on the Senate supplementary measure. There are several procedural hurdles to taking this route—most previous attempts have failed—but the key requirements include finding a sufficient number of Republicans willing to defy Trump and join a bipartisan majority, as well as enduring a waiting period during which that coalition can be dismantled. There are several procedural hurdles to taking this route—most previous attempts have failed—but the key requirements include finding a sufficient number of Republicans willing to defy Trump and join a bipartisan majority, as well as enduring a waiting period during which that coalition can be dismantled.
Other choices exist, but their chances are slim until the political issues that have stalled the legislation are resolved. One alternative is to introduce an omnibus package that includes federal expenditure for the remainder of fiscal year 2024 (i.e., until the end of September) with the Senate’s Ukraine addition as a rider. That path, however, may encounter the same political issues that Ukraine is currently facing; Trump’s Freedom Caucus members may choose to shut down the government rather than back help on terms they find unacceptable. Another is much less ideal. Trump’s Freedom Caucus members may choose to shut down the government rather than back out on terms they find unacceptable. Another is much less ideal.
Another less ideal option is for the appropriations committees to increase assistance to Ukraine in the base budget established by the new spending bill currently being negotiated in order to avoid a shutdown. However, this alternative may face pushback from Republicans, who regard it as an attempt to smuggle in supplementary financing through the back door. It is also possible that Speaker Johnson may alter his mind concerning the Senate supplementary measure, though this is improbable. For the time being, some Republicans in Congress are attempting to pare back the Senate version in the hopes of gaining majority support for a smaller package.
If Congress does not act, what further aid can the Biden administration offer?
Executive branch officials and members of Congress emphasize that the supplementary financing supplied over the previous two years has facilitated the flow of weaponry, ammunition, and other supplies to Ukraine’s front lines. The Biden administration has emphasized that “there is no magic pot of money” and no “Plan B” if Congress fails to act. Without more finance, the flow of material to Ukraine will come to a standstill, perhaps ending the military effort. Already, the Biden administration has attributed the Ukrainian retreat from Avdeeva to Congressional inactivity.
Absent Congressional action, the Biden administration has a few alternatives for continuing to provide Ukraine with little security support. The Department of Defense, relying on authorities to enhance partner capabilities, might prioritize measures such as training Ukrainian forces. The Department of State might assist Kyiv with specific issues, including border security and law enforcement. The president can authorize transfers of US-made commodities from third parties to Ukraine, which means that other nations can purchase US weapons and ammunition and pass them on to Ukraine, as several European states are doing. However, authorities emphasize that at current financing levels, these methods provide only a small portion of what the additional funding legislation would provide and what the Ukrainian war effort requires.
Similarly, the much-discussed idea of leveraging confiscated Russian assets to bridge the deficit would be impractical. Such a move would raise significant issues under international law that would need to be carefully negotiated, which is why authorities in Europe (where the majority of the assets are held) have been hesitant to consider proposals that go beyond the diversion of earnings from invested assets. Even under more expansive interpretations of how the assets would be used, there appears to be widespread agreement (even in the United States Congress) that they should be used for reparations, i.e., to punish Russia for the harm it has caused Ukraine, rather than for military support.
Could other countries step in to fill the void if the United States leaves?
No other country can currently match the United States’ ability to offer military help on short notice. Even though European military assistance disbursements to Ukraine are just €2 billion (about $2.16 billion) less than those of the United States, the latter (unlike the EU and its member states) has substantial reserves from which to draw. Since the all-out invasion, Washington has established quick-turn contracts for new weaponry, but Europeans have taken longer to ramp up. Even though some European countries are acquiring US-made equipment to help, the process might take time. The EU aimed to deploy one million shells to Ukraine by March through a combination of stockpile drawdowns, manufacturing, and foreign acquisitions, but it appears that it will only meet half of that objective.
Europe has struggled in other ways, too. EU countries have battled over the often-opposing aims of aiding Ukraine while also ensuring that the European weapons sector benefits and thrives from it. As a result, they have been hesitant about utilizing pooled European funds to buy guns from the United States and other suppliers, despite the fact that individual nations have acquired US-made weapons. If a future Trump administration opted to cancel it, EU member states would struggle to compensate for the training, intelligence-sharing, and other non-material help supplied by the US to Ukraine. During a February visit to Washington, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, whose country is the second-largest provider of military aid to Ukraine, emphasized how difficult it would be for Europe to replace US help. “Let’s not beat around the bush,” he stated. “Support from the United States is indispensable.”.
Perhaps, but the EU and its member states should not take this idea at face value. Rather, they should take bilateral measures to alleviate Ukraine’s ammunition shortage, such as digging deeper into national stockpiles, placing procurement orders, and purchasing ammunition directly on the international market (measures reportedly advocated by the EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, in a private letter to member states). The Czech Republic’s emergency plan to collect $1.5 billion to buy shells from outside is impressive and should be emulated. Furthermore, EU member states should act quickly to settle the problems that are impeding the next €5 billion (about $5.4 billion) tranche of military assistance for Ukraine.
Over time, the EU will also need to do more to provide long-term funding for military supplies to Ukraine and revive European weapons manufacturing—steps critical to supporting Ukraine, developing Europe’s defiance industry, and allowing the bloc to better provide for its long-term security.
The more Europeans can do to assist Ukraine now and put themselves up for a secure future, the better. Not only are these worthy goals in and of themselves, but pursuing them will provide fodder for proponents in the United States Congress who argue, correctly, that allowing more US assistance to Ukraine now can only help lay the groundwork for a future in which Europe plays a larger role in protecting regional security, benefiting both its own interests and those of its longstanding transatlantic partners.
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